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Abstract
In this paper we describe a method to decompose a well-known measure of debt
ratings mobility into it’s directional components. We show, using sovereign debt
ratings as an example, that this directional decomposition allows us to better un-
derstand the underlying characteristics of debt ratings migration and, for the case
of the data set used, that the standard Markov chain model is not homogeneous in
either the time or cross-sectional dimensions. We ﬁnd that the directional decom-
position also allows us to sign the change in quality of debt over time and across
sub-groups of the population.
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11 Introduction
Arguably, the widespread adoption of Basle norms for supervision of banks and the rapid
growth of the market for credit derivatives are among the two most important develop-
ments in the world of banking and ﬁnance since the abandonment of the Bretton Woods
system in 1973. The Basle norms, which came into force in nine of the G-10 countries
in 1992, and have since been adopted by bank regulators in a wide range of countries,
initially penalised banks for risk associated with their credit portfolios, by requiring them
to maintain a minimum amount of capital in proportion to the risk weighted assets on
their balance sheets. Basle II recognised the need to take into consideration market risk
and organizational risk as well, in the process of building a sound banking system. Banks
that are subjected to Basle II regulations are required to undertake value-at-risk (VaR)
exercises to determine the extent of the market risk of their asset portfolio. Over roughly
the same time period, making a quantum leap from a nascent market up until the mid-
dle of the nineties, the size of the credit derivatives market exceeded USD 8 trillion at
the end of 2006. Credit default swaps accounted for roughly 50 percent of the market.
Altman (1998) provides an excellent discussion about the importance of understanding
the patterns of credit rating migration.
It is easily seen that the common thread linking the Basle norms for banking regulation
and the rapidly growing market for credit derivatives is that both attach signiﬁcant
importance to unfavorable events in the market. Changes in interest and exchange rates,
as well as equity and commodity prices can adversely aﬀect the value of a bank’s asset
portfolio, and Basle II aims to ensure, among other things, that the capital base of a bank
would be able to absorb an adverse movement in these market prices without resorting to
bail out and closure. The contracts exchanged in the market for credit derivatives, on the
other hand, hinge on events that could either be defaults on a loan or those that are close
approximations of a default, e.g., postponement of payment of interest. The likelihood
of the occurrence of an unfavorable event that can reduce the value of an asset portfolio
2or trigger an event included in a credit derivatives contract are, in turn, related to the
phenomenon of ratings migration. Banks and investors have to take into consideration
the probability of ratings downgrades (or, more generally, changes) of securities (or their
issuers) that are either directly included in their portfolios or are underlying assets for
credit derivatives products of which they are a counter-party. Speciﬁcally, they have
to factor in the likelihood of ratings downgrades (and upgrades) when they decide on
the prices of these securities and derivatives products, as also the likely future needs for
capital (in the case of a bank).
While there are several ways to model the likelihood of a ratings migration, most
of these models make use of assumptions that are unrealistic (Albanese & Chen 2006).
For example, Jarrow et al. (1997) postulate that the likelihood of an upgrade and a
downgrade are the same even though it can be convincingly argued, for example, that
the likelihood of a sovereign rating downgrade is often higher for developing countries
while that of an upgrade is higher for industrialized (or rapidly industrializing) countries.
More importantly, they compute a composite likelihood of ratings migration that is not
informative about the individual probabilities of a downgrade and an upgrade. Yet, as
we have argued above, measures of these individual probabilities are important both to
compute an accurate VaR measure for an asset portfolio and to accurately price a deriva-
tives product that is structured to protect against a movement in one direction, namely,
a default. In this paper, using sovereign ratings data obtained from Moody’s Investors
Service, for the 1996-2005 period, we address this relatively unexplored methodological
aspect of modeling ratings migration.
In this paper we use a time-homogeneous discrete-state ﬁrst-order Markov model
to estimate credit migration (transition) matrices for sovereign debt ratings of various
groups of countries. We are interested in testing for diﬀerences in the inferred migration
matrices across diﬀerent groups of countries and across diﬀerent economic conditions.
As in Jafry & Schuermann (2004) we argue that the standard metrics that are used to
3distinguish migration matrices (for example, the mobility indices introduced by Shorrocks
(1978) that are based on the eigenvalues of the migration matrix) do not fully describe
the important characteristics of credit rating migration. Jafry & Schuermann (2004)
argues that an important characteristic of ratings migration is the size of the jump, i.e.,
a movement of two ratings classes in one period is diﬀerent to a movement of one ratings
class in the same period. However, like the mobility measures of Shorrocks (1978), the
mobility index suggested by Jafry & Schuermann (2004) does not distinguish between
upward movements and downward movements in the ratings distribution. In this paper
we use the directional mobility measures introduced in Gang et al. (2004) to test for
diﬀerences in two migration matrices based on their implied directional mobility thereby
allowing us to fully characterize the directional mobility of sovereign debt. We therefore
get a better understanding of the underlying dynamics of sovereign debt migration. In
addition, we are able to estimate directional mobility scores conditional on the initial
ratings class of the bonds. It is evident that these conditional measures of upward and
downward mobility of ratings have signiﬁcant implications for two important sets of
investors, namely, those who invest in “cross-over” bonds and those that invest in high
yield bonds.
Bayesian methods are utilized in this paper which allow us to generate exact ﬁnite
sample tests of diﬀerences in sovereign debt ratings migrations. The choice of sovereign
ratings data and the aforementioned time period enriches our analysis in several ways.
First, since the early nineties, a large number of emerging markets (and corporate entities
therein, whose ratings are usually capped at the corresponding sovereign ratings) have
regularly accessed the global ﬁnancial market to raise funds. Our sample, therefore,
includes a number of emerging markets from Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and
Latin America, thereby allowing us to compare and contrast not only the likelihood of
upward and downward mobility of ratings of industrialized and emerging economies, but
also those of emerging economies belonging to diﬀerent regions of the world. Second, the
4time period of our data includes three clearly identiﬁable adverse shocks that presumably
had global implications, namely, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998 and
the Argentinean default of 2001. We are, therefore, able to identify the impact of these
crises on the probabilities of upgrades and downgrades for each of the directly aﬀected
regions, the corresponding probabilities of other regions of emerging markets, and the
probabilities associated with the ratings of the developed countries that were lenders to
and investors in these regions. It is easily seen that our data allows us to examine both
the impact of country-speciﬁc or regional events on the likelihood of ratings upgrades
and downgrades, and the nature and pattern of ratings contagions. In other words, it
oﬀers us a scope to comprehensively demonstrate the advantages of our methodology.
We ﬁnd that the time homogenous assumption is rejected for our sample and our time
period. We also show that the ratings migration is not homogenous in the cross-sectional
dimension as well. As such, we are able to demonstrate that knowing the directional
mobility of sovereign debt ratings is important in fully understanding the underlying
dynamics of the debt ratings migration. In some cases we ﬁnd that the directional mo-
bility scores allow us to conclude that the ratings migration matrix has changed between
sub-periods where, otherwise, using only the standard mobility measures we would have
concluded that there was no diﬀerence. We also show that the directional mobility scores
allow us to better explain the diﬀerences between diﬀerent sub-groups of countries and
between diﬀerent time periods. This, in turn, enables us to discuss the relative change
in the quality of the underlying debt directly from the directional mobility scores that
we could not do using the standard overall mobility measures.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the model and the
estimation method and the directional mobility measures used in this paper to distinguish
the ratings migration matrices. Section 3 describes the data and the prior distributions
used in the analysis while Section 4 describes the results. We use these results to demon-
strate the importance of separately estimating upward and downward mobility scores
5for ratings migration and, correspondingly, the shortcoming of an overall mobility score.
Finally Section 5 concludes.
2 Method
2.1 Brief Review of the Methodological Literature
The dynamics, and in particular the mobility, of sovereign debt ratings is studied in
this paper using a ﬁrst order Markov chain. The use of Markov-chain models to study
mobility has a long history with notable early contributions by Champernowne (1953)
and Prais (1955). More recently Shorrocks (1976, 1978) discussed the Markov assumption
with reference to measuring income mobility and introduced measures of mobility that
were functions of the estimated migration (transition) matrices.
A number of papers have also applied Markov models to studying credit rating mi-
gration in the literature. These papers have concentrated on a number of issues, and,
in our paper, we have addressed all the methodological concerns raised in the course of
earlier research. To begin with, there is a discussion in the literature about whether the
time-homogeneity assumption is valid for the case of bond rating migration. Authors
such as Bangia et al. (2002), Nickell et al. (2000) and Wei (2003) argue that we should
condition on macroeconomic factors such as the business cycle when estimating credit
migration matrices, that the migration matrices are sensitive to the underlying economic
conditions. In the empirical part of this paper, we control for changing macroeconomic
conditions by breaking our sample into three sub-samples, namely, a period of the Asian
and Russian crises of the late 1990’s, a period of recovery in these regions of the world
and simultaneously a crisis in Latin America, and ﬁnally a period free of crises and yet
one fraught with uncertainty about rising energy prices and sustainability of growth in
the United States.
Other approaches to relaxing the time homogeneity of the Markov model include
6Frydman & Kadam (2004) which takes into account the age of the bond. They argue the
relatively young bonds face diﬀerent probabilities of migration than older bonds and show
that a model that takes this into account yields statistically and economically diﬀerent
estimates of credit migration probabilities than the standard time-homogeneous ﬁrst
order discrete state Markov model. However, their results also show that for bonds that
have been in existence for longer than four years, the estimates of the ratings migration
probabilities for their approach is almost identical to those estimated from the standard
Markov model. Given our data are on sovereign bonds that have been rated for many
years prior to 1996, the ﬁrst year in our sample period, we think that the results we report
in this paper do not suﬀer from the problem discussed in Frydman & Kadam (2004).
Frydman & Schuermann (2004) relax the homogeneity assumption by estimating a
random mixture Markov model where the probability of transition is modeled by two
credit migration matrices. Each bond’s ratings migration probability has a positive
probability of being described by each of the two migration matrices. They show that
this random mixture model statistically dominates the standard model for corporate
bonds. In keeping with the spirit of this line of reasoning, in this paper, we account
for the possibility that diﬀerent bonds could face diﬀerent migration probabilities by
separating the sovereign bonds into sub-groups based on country characteristics.
Finally, recent work by Fuertes & Kalotychou (2007) show that for sovereign debt,
downgrades and upgrades should be treated diﬀerently. As mentioned earlier, this is the
focus of our paper. We estimate a discrete-state ﬁrst order Markov model with the aim
of testing for diﬀerences in upward and downward ratings mobility for diﬀerent groups
of countries during diﬀerent time-periods of recent history.
2.2 Markov Chains and Ratings Migration
One of the most appealing aspects of using a Markov-chain to model ratings dynamics
across individual countries is the ability to investigate issues such as diﬀerences in ratings
7mobility over time, among subgroups of the population. The Markov assumption is a
natural way of thinking about ratings dynamics while imposing only minimal theoretical
structure on the dynamics of the system.
The ﬁrst order discrete-state Markov model is as follows: Let there be C ratings
classiﬁcations where C is a ﬁnite number. Let πt = (π1t,...,πCt)′ be the distribution
across the C classes where πkt is the proportion of the total population that is in class
k at time t. Therefore the variable πt deﬁnes the “state” of the world at time t. The
ﬁrst-order Markov assumption implies that the state of the world today is only dependent
on πt−1. That is,
P(πt|πt−1,πt−2,...,πt−j) = P(πt|πt−1) ∀ j = 2,3,..., (1)
where P(.) represents the conditional probability distribution of π. Deﬁne the probability
of transiting (migrating) from class i in period t-1 to class j in period t to be P(πt =
j|πt−1 = i) ≡ pij so that the Markov transition (migration) matrix, P, can be deﬁned as
P = [pij]. Then the ﬁrst order Markov chain model is
π
′
t = π
′
t−1P. (2)
The initial income distribution is π0 and it is simple to show that π′
t = π′
0Pt.
This paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate and make inferences from the Markov
chain model outlined above. One important consequence of using Bayesian methods is
that it is simple to characterize the exact ﬁnite sample properties of the distribution of
any function of the primal parameters, π0 and P, of the model. For example, we are
able to characterize the distribution of various mobility indices such as the probability of
moving to a higher income class. More detail about the particular mobility indices that
we are interested in can be found in Section 2.3 below.
Before discussing in detail the measure of mobility and the tests used in this paper
8we ﬁrst discuss our sampling scheme. We observe N countries over T time periods
and place them into C classiﬁcations. Let i ∈ {1,2,...,C}, n ∈ {1,2,...,N}, and let
t ∈ {1,2,...,T}. For each country, n, deﬁne
δnit =

  
  
1 if country n is in class i for time period t
0 else
. (3)
For each country, n, and for each time period t we observe the country’s sovereign debt
ratings class snt ∈ {1,2,3,...,C}. Let SNT = {{snt}N
n=1}T
t=1 be the information set at
time T. Deﬁne kj0 =
 N
n=1 δnj0 as the number of countries that are in class j in the
initial period and deﬁne kij =
 N
n=1
 T
t=1 δni(t−1)δnjt as the total number of transitions
from class i in time period t-1 to class j in time period t across all time periods. The
matrix K = [kij] will be referred to as the data transition matrix. Note that if T > 2 it
is implicitly assumed that P is the same for all T-1 transition periods.
The data density, or likelihood function, for the model deﬁned in (2) is
p(SNT|π0,P) ∝
C  
i=1
π
ki0
i0
C  
j=1
p
kij
ij (4)
which is the kernel of the product of two independent multivariate Dirichlet (Beta) dis-
tributions. Natural conjugate priors for π0 and P are also independent Dirichlet distri-
butions deﬁned as
p(π0) =
 
Γ(
 C
i=1 ai0)
 C
i=1 Γ(ai0)
 
C  
i=1
π
(ai0−1)
i0 (5)
and
p(P) =
C  
i=1
 
Γ(
 C
j=1aij)
 C
j=1 Γ(aij)
 
C  
j=1
π
(aij−1)
ij . (6)
Here the priors are parameterized by the vector a0 = (a10,...,aC0)′ and A = [aij].
9Assuming that the priors are independent then the posterior distribution for (2) is
p(π0,P|SNT) ∝
 
Γ(
 C
i=1 ai0)
 C
i=1Γ(ai0)
 
C  
i=1
π
(ki0+ai0−1)
i0
C  
i=1
  
Γ(
 C
j=1aij)
 C
j=1 Γ(aij)
 
C  
j=1
π
(kij+aij−1)
ij
 
. (7)
The joint posterior density kernel in (7) is the kernel for the product of two Dirichlet
distributions. The posterior distribution for π0, the initial income distribution, is Dirich-
let with parameters (k10 + a10,...,kC0 + aC0)′. The posterior distribution for P is the
product of C independent Dirichlet distributions with parameters (ki1+ai1,...,kiC+aiC)′
for i = 1,...,C (Geweke 2005). This posterior distribution is simple to draw directly
from so in this instance no Markov chain monte carlo procedure is needed to make draws
from the (7). In fact is a simple matter to make identical and independent draws from
these independent Dirichlet distributions using the method described in Devroye (1986).
Once we have these i.i.d draws from the posterior we can then characterize the exact
ﬁnite sample distribution of any function of the parameters (π0 and A) of the model.
Examples of such functions include the measures of overall mobility and measures of
directional mobility, which we deﬁne in Section 2.3.
2.3 Mobility Measures
There are many measures of overall mobility that can be deﬁned. For a complete discus-
sion of the properties and deﬁnitions of a large number of mobility measures see Shorrocks
(1978) and Geweke et al. (1986). In this paper we report the mobility measure due to
Shorrocks (1978),
Ms(P) =
C − tr(P)
C − 1
, (8)
which is the inverse of the harmonic mean of the expected length of stay in a ratings class,
scaled by a factor of C/(C − 1). This index satisﬁes the monotonicity, immobility and
strong immobility persistence criteria and hence are internally consistent.1 This measure
1See Geweke et al. (1986) for a complete discussion on the properties of these mobility indices.
10of mobility measures overall mobility and treats movements to higher ratings classes
equally with movements to lower ratings classes. We also report conditional mobility
measures due to Prais (1955) which report the probability of moving conditional on the
initial classiﬁcation. This conditional measure of mobility is deﬁned as
Mp(j) =
C  
k=1,k =j
pjk, (9)
for j = 1,...,C.
In the case of bond ratings, movements up the rating distribution have quite diﬀer-
ent implications to movements down the ratings distribution. Hence we would like to
distinguish between the two types of mobility. To do that we use directional mobility
measures proposed in Gang et al. (2004). Aggregate measures of upward and downward
mobility are
MU = (C − 1)
−1
C−1  
j=1
MU(j), (10)
and
MD = (C − 1)
−1
C  
j=2
MD(j). (11)
Gang et al. (2004) show that Shorrocks’ measure can be decomposed into its upward
and downward components. That is, MS = MU + MD and that these directional
mobility measures satisfy directional equivalents of the monotonicity, immobility and
strong immobility persistence criterions.
That is, for any transition probability matrix (ratings migration matrix), P1, MU(P1) ≥
0, with the inequality being strict if there are any non-zero elements in the upper-
triangular part of P1.2 Thus the upward mobility measure is positive if there is any
probability that a bond will be upgraded to a higher ratings class. Similarly, MD ≥ 0,
2The term “ratings migration matrix” is used extensively in the ratings migration literature and is
just the transition probability matrix referred to above. The two terms are used interchangeably in this
paper.
11with the inequality being strict if there are any non-zero elements in the lower triangular
part of P1: the downward mobility measure is positive only if there is a positive prob-
ability that a bond will be downgraded to a lower ratings class. Finally, monotonicity
implies that for two diﬀerent ratings migration matrices, P1 and P2, MU(P1) > MU(P2)
implies that the ratings migration matrix, P1 represents a process that has more upward
mobility than the ratings migration process represented by the matrix P2. Similarly,
MD(P1) > MD(P2) would imply that the ratings migration process represented by
the ratings migration matrix P1 would have more downward mobility than the ratings
migration process represented by P2.
The second set of directional indices report the probability of moving up or down the
distribution conditional on the current class. These indices are:
MU(j) =
M  
k=j+1
pjk (12)
and
MD(j) =
j−1  
k=1
pjk. (13)
These two indices describe the probability of moving to a higher (lower) classiﬁcation in
the next period given the state is in classiﬁcation j this period. It can also be shown that
Mp(j) = MU(j) + MD(j) for j = 1,...,C and that these directional mobility indices
satisfy the directional persistence criteria of Geweke et al. (1986).
3 Data and Priors
3.1 Data
The data are obtained from various issues of Sovereign Ratings List published by Moody’s
Investors Service (henceforth Moody’s). We select countries for which a reasonably long
time series data for ratings on foreign currency denominated long term bonds are avail-
12able. This selection criterion results in a ﬁnal sample of 92 countries. Of these, 13 are
classiﬁed as Asian countries, 21 as Latin American countries, 16 as Transition countries
of Central and Eastern Europe (including former Soviet Republics), 23 are OECD coun-
tries, and 19 as other.3 As discussed elsewhere in this paper, much of our analysis will
focus on the comparison of three of these (broadly speaking) geographical groups of coun-
tries, namely, Asian countries, Latin American countries, and Transition countries. The
industrialized OECD countries act as a benchmark, while other is a residual category
that is too heterogenous to support any meaningful analysis.
It should be noted that our classiﬁcation does not adhere to geographical locations
and oﬃcial nomenclature alone, and takes into consideration the relative similarity of the
countries with respect to structure and macroeconomic stability of their economies. For
example, even though the Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia are Asian countries,
as oil producing countries they are structurally diﬀerent from other Asian countries like
China, India and Thailand. Hence, all oil-producing West Asian countries are classiﬁed as
other. Similarly, even though countries like Turkey and the Czech Republic are OECD
member countries, the structure and macroeconomic stability their economies are, in
general, not comparable with industrialized countries like the United States and Japan.
They were certainly not comparable with an average OECD country in 1996, the starting
point of our analysis. Hence, while the Central and Eastern European members of the
OECD community have been classiﬁed under Transition, Turkey has been included in the
other category along with the West Asian countries. The classiﬁcations of the countries
are reported in Table 1.4
3Note that we do not have an African country-category; all the African countries in our sample are
part of the other category. It was diﬃcult to create a separate African group with just ﬁve countries
because of the computational problems associated with a large number of empty cells in the transition
matrix.
4It should be noted that these classiﬁcations are not mutually exclusive. For example, Japan is
included in both the OECD grouping and the Asian grouping as Japan well ﬁts the description of both
classiﬁcations. Similarly, Mexico is included both in the OECD sample and the Latin American sample.
13Table 1: Countries in our Sample
Asia Latin America Transition
CHINA ARGENTINA BULGARIA
HONG KONG BOLIVIA CROATIA
INDIA BRAZIL CZECH REPUBLIC
INDONESIA CHILE ESTONIA
JAPAN COLOMBIA HUNGARY
KOREA COSTA RICA KAZAKHSTAN
MALAYSIA CUBA LATVIA
PAKISTAN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC LITHUANIA
PHILIPPINES ECUADOR MOLDOVA
SINGAPORE EL SALVADOR POLAND
TAIWAN GUATEMALA ROMANIA
THAILAND HONDURAS RUSSIA
VIETNAM JAMAICA SLOVAKIA
MEXICO SLOVENIA
NICARAGUA TURKMENISTAN
PANAMA UKRAINE
PARAGUAY
PERU
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
OECD Other
AUSTRALIA BAHRAIN
AUSTRIA BOTSWANA
BELGIUM CYPRUS
CANADA EGYPT
DENMARK FIJI
FINLAND IRAN
FRANCE ISRAEL
GERMANY JORDAN
GREECE LEBANON
ICELAND MALTA
IRELAND MAURITIUS
ITALY MOROCCO
JAPAN OMAN
MEXICO PAPUA NEW GUINEA
NETHERLANDS QATAR
NEW ZEALAND SAUDI ARABIA
NORWAY SOUTH AFRICA
PORTUGAL TUNISIA
SPAIN TURKEY
SWEDEN U.A.E.
SWITZERLAND
UK
USA
14Table 2: Deﬁnition of Ratings Classes
Class Lowest rating Highest rating 20-year cumulative default rates
1 C Caa1 77.198-100.000
2 B3 B1 53.179-61.888
3 Ba3 Ba1 22.919-45.112
4 Baa3 Baa1 6.276-11.355
5 A3 A1 2.267-5.176
6 Aa3 Aa1 0.958-1.560
7 Aaa Aaa 0.190
3.2 Ratings Classiﬁcations
Since the model we use is a discrete state Markov chain, we need to deﬁne the ratings
classiﬁcations. Moody’s has developed a sophisticated ratings system that can attach
one of twenty one possible ratings to a sovereign long term foreign currency bond. The
Aaa rating indicates that the bond is of exceptionally high credit worthiness and carries
minimum credit risk. The credit quality of the bonds decline as we move down the rating
scale; Aa rated bonds arguably have excellent (but not exceptional) credit worthiness,
A rated bonds have good credit worthiness, and Baa rated bonds have adequate credit
worthiness. Baa3 is the lowest credit rating for an investment grade bond. Below the
investment grade threshold, credit worthiness declines in discrete steps from Ba3 to C.
Bonds with Ba ratings have questionable credit worthiness, those with B have poor
credit worthiness, and a rating of Caa imply very poor credit worthiness. Credit risk is
particularly high for Caa3 through Caa1 rated bonds, and bonds that are rated Ca and
C are either actually in default or are in default for all practical purposes.5
In our analysis, we attempt to strike a balance between the information content of the
ratings categories and the practical problem of having classiﬁcation bins with non-zero
observations that is essential for the analysis. Our classiﬁcations are reported in Table 2.
5For details about ratings classiﬁcation and a discussion about the factors that aﬀect sovereign credit
ratings, see Cantor & Packer (1996).
15We make the reasonable assumption that the numeric part of all alphanumeric ratings,
e.g., 3 for a Baa3 rating, are reﬁnements of the (basic) alphabetical ratings (i.e., Baa).
This simplifying assumption is consistent with the classiﬁcations used by Altman (1998),
and is also supported by the the cumulative 20-year default rates of bonds during the
1983-2006 period, which we report in table.6 It is easily seen that the ranges of default
rates are non-overlapping across our ratings classes, such that our ratings classes are
mutually exclusive. Our only innovation is to merge the alphabetical ratings categories
Caa and C into class 1, essentially arguing that there is not much diﬀerence between
bonds that have very high default probability and those that are actually in default.
This is consistent with the comparable cumulative default rates of 73.48% and 78.46%
for Caa2 (the median of the Caa alphabetical category) and C rated bonds, respectively.
3.3 Priors
We deﬁne natural conjugate priors for the parameters π0 and P. In fact we deﬁne C +1
independent prior distributions for π0 and the C rows of P. Each prior has the same
form. The general form of the priors for π0 and for the jth row of P, P(j), is deﬁned in
(14),
(π10,...,πC0) ∼ DiM(a0)
(pj1,...,pjM) ∼ DiM(A(j)) j = 1,...,M.
(14)
where DiM(a0) and DiM(A(j)) refer to a multivariate-Beta (Dirichlet) of order M − 1
indexed by the parameter vector a0 = (a1,...,aM), and A(j) = (Aj1,...,AjM), respec-
6See Exhibit 26 of Corporate default and recovery rates, 1920-2006, Moody’s Investors Service, Febru-
ary 2007.
16tively. The multivariate-Beta distribution of order M − 1 has density
p(x|a) =
Γ
  M
j=1 aj
 
 M
j=1 Γ(aj)
M  
j=1
x
(aj−1)
j (15)
where aj > 0 for all j = 1,...,M and x ∈ {x : xj > 0 (j = 1,...,M),
 M
j=1xj = 1}.
The priors deﬁned are therefore indexed by the vector a0 and the matrix A. This prior
has a notional sample interpretation in that we can interpret the values of a0 to be the
observations from a notional data set with a01 observations in the ﬁrst ratings class, a02
observations in the second ratings class and so on. This notional interpretation is nice
in the sense that the smaller are the values in a0 the less inﬂuence they have on the
posterior distribution.
The prior in this context has two important uses. First, it allows us to explicitly
state our prior beliefs about the parameters of the model. Second, it allows us to “ﬁll
in” zero elements of the data transition matrix, K. In our application, with classiﬁcation
deﬁnitions given in Table 2, we do not observe any transition from classiﬁcation 1 to
classiﬁcation 7 in any single period. Hence, the data transition matrix, K, has a zero
in the 7th column of the 1st row. In the deﬁnition of the Dirichlet distribution of order
M − 1 given in (15) we see that the parameter vector that indexes the distribution
cannot contain any zero elements. The posterior distribution, given in (7), is the product
of M+1 Dirichlet distribution where the posterior of the jth row of P, P(j), is indexed by
A(j) + K(j), the sum of the jth rows of A and N. Thus, as long as the prior parameter,
A(j), does not contain any 0’s, the posterior parameter will not contain any zero elements.
The priors used in this paper are designed to reﬂect our uncertainly over the parame-
ters of the model. The ﬁrst parameter is the initial ratings distribution. The prior chosen
for this parameter is indexed by a0 = (0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1). Thus the prior ini-
tial distribution is a uniform distribution in that each rating class is equally likely in the
prior. The fact that each value of a0 is small reﬂects our desire to have the data drive
17the posterior distribution. In a notional prior context the prior as stated implies that
the prior comes from a notional data set with only 0.1 “observations” in each ratings
class. Thus every observation from the data set is weighted ten times as much as our
“observations” from the notional prior data set. The prior for P is indexed by A. Each
row of A refers to an independent prior for the corresponding row of P. Each row of
A was chosen so that the probability of staying in the current ratings class is 3.5 times
more likely than the probability of moving to another class. For example the ﬁrst row
of A is (0.21,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003). This prior places most of the
prior probability on the main diagonal of P. This prior yields a prior probability of
not moving of 0.99 and a combined prior probability of moving of 0.01 for each ratings
class. Again that numbers were chosen to be small relative to the number of observed
transitions so that the calculated posterior is driven mainly by the observed data. The
other nice consequence of this prior is that the prior represents a notional data set where
there is almost no change in the ratings classes of the “observations”. This implies that
the posterior distribution of the mobility scores will be driven by observed movements
in actual debt ratings rather than movements in debt ratings from the notional prior
distribution.
4 Empirical Results: Overall vs. Upward and Down-
ward Mobility Scores
In this section we report mobility indices for our whole sample of 92 countries and for
various interesting sub-groups of countries. We report mobility indices for transitions
from 1996 to 2005, as well as for the sub-periods 1996-1999, 2000-2002, and 2002-2005.
For each time period we report the Shorrocks’ overall measure of mobility and the de-
composition of the Shorrocks measure into its directional components. We also report
the conditional (Prais) measures of mobility for each ratings class together with it’s
18directional decomposition.
Table 3 reports mobility indices for the full sample of countries. The table is broken
up into four sections, one for each time period that we look at. Looking ﬁrst at ratings
mobility of the full sample of countries, we see that the mobility is similar for the full
sample period (1996-2005) and for the ﬁrst two sub-periods of 1996-1999 and 1999-2002.
The overall mobility for the whole sample is 0.126 while for the ﬁrst two sub-periods it
is 0.132 and 0.138 respectively. Only for the last period (2002-2005) is there a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence with the overall mobility signiﬁcantly lower at 0.09. However when we look
at the directional mobility indices we see that mobility during the sub-periods are quite
diﬀerent. For the ﬁrst sub-period (1996-1999) the downward mobility score is higher than
the upward mobility score suggesting that countries were more likely to be downgraded
during this period than upgraded. This result turns around sharply during the second
period (1999-2002) where the upward mobility score is ten times the downward mobility
score. This suggests that, whereas the period from 1996-1999 was a period of ﬁnancial
stress, the period from 1999-2002 was a period of recovery where countries who were
downgraded earlier were now upgraded.
The conditional (Prais) mobility scores provide deeper insight into these ratings mi-
gration pattern. In the period from 1996-1999, most of the (downward) action takes
place in ratings classes 3, 4 and 5, i.e., those just below or just above investment grade.
Here we see the conditional downward mobility scores being signiﬁcantly higher than the
upward scores. Thus it appears that the countries that were likely to be downgraded
were emerging markets as opposed to mature industrialized economies. In addition, we
see that the probability of moving out of the lowest ratings class is much lower in the
ﬁrst period than the subsequent periods while the probability of downgrade of Aa and
Aaa rated bonds remained roughly similar across time periods. This goes on to suggest
that it is the marginally investment grade and below investment grade countries that are
driving the result.
19Table 3: Mobility Measures: Full Sample
1996-2005 1996-99
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.126 0.088 0.038 0.132 0.054 0.079
(0.015) (0.013) (0.007) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017)
Prais
Class 1 0.121 0.121 — 0.003 0.003 —
(0.056) (0.056) — (0.039) (0.039) —
Class 2 0.134 0.074 0.060 0.131 0.065 0.066
(0.030) (0.023) (0.021) (0.060) (0.044) (0.044)
Class 3 0.175 0.088 0.088 0.209 0.037 0.172
(0.032) (0.023) (0.024) (0.055) (0.026) (0.050)
Class 4 0.126 0.084 0.042 0.104 0.034 0.069
(0.026) (0.021) (0.016) (0.040) (0.024) (0.033)
Class 5 0.057 0.029 0.028 0.213 0.087 0.126
(0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.081) (0.060) (0.066)
Class 6 0.134 0.134 0.000 0.097 0.097 0.000
(0.036) (0.036) (0.001) (0.044) (0.044) (0.000)
Class 7 0.008 — 0.008 0.037 — 0.037
(0.009) — (0.009) (0.037) — (0.037)
1999-2002 2002-05
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.138 0.126 0.012 0.090 0.060 0.030
(0.024) (0.024) (0.006) (0.019) (0.016) (0.010)
Prais
Class 1 0.139 0.139 — 0.110 0.110 —
(0.090) (0.090) — (0.068) (0.068) —
Class 2 0.109 0.056 0.054 0.167 0.106 0.060
(0.042) (0.032) (0.028) (0.052) (0.043) (0.033)
Class 3 0.146 0.146 0.000 0.159 0.080 0.080
(0.052) (0.052) (0.001) (0.059) (0.044) (0.043)
Class 4 0.162 0.145 0.017 0.103 0.062 0.041
(0.047) (0.045) (0.017) (0.045) (0.036) (0.027)
Class 5 0.035 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.032) (0.032) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Class 6 0.236 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.069) (0.069) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005)
Class 7 0.000 — 0.000 0.000 — 0.000
(0.003) — (0.003) (0.001) — (0.001)
20We now divide the countries into their sub-categories in an attempt to understand
the results obtained for the group of countries as a whole. First we look at the mobility
scores for the sub-group of Asian countries that are reported in Table 4. Looking ﬁrst at
the full sample period (1996-2005), we see that the overall mobility score for the Asian
countries (0.180) is higher than the overall mobility score for the full sample of countries
(0.126), suggesting that the former were experienced more ratings migration during this
period than the sample countries as a whole. We also see that the overall mobility for
Asian countries is equally divided into upward and downward mobility. By contrast, for
the full sample of countries upward mobility and downward mobility contributed roughly
two-thirds and one-third of the overall score respectively. The highest mobility occurs in
ratings classes 3 and 4 and upward and downward mobility scores contribute equally to
the overall mobility of these ratings classes.
However when we break the sample into three distinct time-periods a richer story
emerges. In the ﬁrst sub-period (1996-1999), we see that there is more overall mobility
for the Asian countries (0.246) than the 1996-2005 average (0.180) but that this mobility is
almost entirely downward mobility (0.229). The individual classes that suﬀer the biggest
mobility are classes 4, 5, and 7 with downward mobility scores signiﬁcantly higher than
the average. In the second sub-period (1999-2002) the direction of mobility is reversed.
The overall mobility is lower (0.119) compared to the ﬁrst sub-period (0.246). Further,
the composition of the mobility during this period is also quite diﬀerent with almost all of
the mobility being upward mobility. The individual classes that have the highest mobility
in the second period are classes 3, 4, and 6 suggesting that many of the down-gradings
that occurred in the previous period were reversed in this period.
The last sub-period (2002-2005) has a very similar overall mobility to the second
sub-period (0.104), and the break-down of this mobility is such that two-thirds of the
overall mobility is upward mobility and one-third of the overall mobility is downward
mobility. In other words, the ratings recovery of the Asian countries continued into the
21Table 4: Mobility Measures: Asian Countries
1996-2005 1996-99
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.180 0.096 0.084 0.246 0.017 0.229
(0.043) (0.034) (0.027) (0.064) (0.016) (0.064)
Prais
Class 1 0.193 0.193 — 0.004 0.004 —
(0.161) (0.161) — (0.040) (0.040) —
Class 2 0.097 0.051 0.047 0.194 0.000 0.193
(0.063) (0.047) (0.046) (0.158) (0.004) (0.158)
Class 3 0.273 0.136 0.137 0.274 0.096 0.178
(0.095) (0.070) (0.073) (0.129) (0.085) (0.110)
Class 4 0.192 0.096 0.096 0.399 0.000 0.399
(0.084) (0.064) (0.062) (0.202) (0.006) (0.202)
Class 5 0.115 0.000 0.115 0.281 0.000 0.281
(0.060) (0.000) (0.060) (0.130) (0.005) (0.130)
Class 6 0.100 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.066) (0.066) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Class 7 0.107 — 0.107 0.324 — 0.324
(0.096) — (0.096) (0.228) — (0.228)
1999-2002 2002-05
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.119 0.117 0.001 0.104 0.070 0.034
(0.048) (0.047) (0.010) (0.042) (0.037) (0.028)
Prais
Class 1 0.260 0.260 — 0.008 0.008 —
(0.200) (0.200) — (0.061) (0.061) —
Class 2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.097 0.097 0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.088) (0.088) (0.001)
Class 3 0.129 0.128 0.001 0.405 0.205 0.200
(0.117) (0.117) (0.011) (0.205) (0.167) (0.165)
Class 4 0.110 0.110 0.000 0.111 0.110 0.000
(0.097) (0.097) (0.002) (0.097) (0.097) (0.008)
Class 5 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.015)
Class 6 0.206 0.206 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.123) (0.123) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012)
Class 7 0.007 — 0.007 0.001 — 0.001
(0.056) — (0.056) (0.007) — (0.007)
22new century, albeit at a slower pace.
Another grouping of countries that faced economic crises during the sample period are
the Latin American countries. The sovereign rating mobility scores for these countries
are reported in Table 4. For the full sample period (1996-2005), as well as for the ﬁrst two
sub-periods, we see that the Latin American countries have fairly low overall mobility,
approximately half of which is the contribution of each of upward and downward mobility.
The diﬀerences in the directional mobility scores is not statistically signiﬁcant for any of
these three time periods. This is in sharp contrast with the much higher overall mobility
scores for the Asian countries in the ﬁrst two sub-periods. As such, this implies that
there was no ratings contagion from the Asian countries to the Latin American countries
during 1996-1999 and, consequently, no ratings rebound among the latter during 1999-
2002 either.
A plausible explanation for the absence of ratings contagion across these two regions
dominated by emerging markets is that the ratings of most Latin American countries
were low to begin with, typically below the investment grade, and hence, in the absence
of catastrophic events, there was not much scope signiﬁcant further downgrade in 1996-
1999. Table 6 reports the posterior distribution of the initial distribution of sovereign
debt ratings for Latin American countries for each starting period of our sub-samples.
It is easily seen that during both 1996 and 1999 more than 70% of these countries had
ratings below the investment grade.
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis in Argentina (2002-2005), the ratings mobility
of Latin American countries more than doubled compared with the corresponding number
of 1999-2002, from 0.045 to 0.091. However, this overall mobility score for 2002-2005 is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the 1996-1999 score of 0.077. Hence, in the absence of
the ability to decompose the overall score into upward and downward mobility scores,
it would seem that ratings migration in Latin America for 1996-1999 and 1999-2002 are
23Table 5: Mobility Measures: Latin American Countries
1996-2005 1996-99
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.077 0.037 0.041 0.077 0.032 0.044
(0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.031) (0.020) (0.024)
Prais
Class 1 0.087 0.087 — 0.007 0.007 —
(0.057) (0.057) — (0.066) (0.066) —
Class 2 0.158 0.070 0.088 0.189 0.128 0.061
(0.047) (0.032) (0.037) (0.093) (0.078) (0.058)
Class 3 0.138 0.059 0.079 0.168 0.056 0.112
(0.050) (0.033) (0.038) (0.087) (0.054) (0.074)
Class 4 0.067 0.000 0.067 0.079 0.000 0.079
(0.037) (0.001) (0.037) (0.071) (0.002) (0.071)
Class 5 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.049) (0.033) (0.037) (0.050) (0.026) (0.042)
Class 6 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.005
(0.048) (0.030) (0.038) (0.054) (0.027) (0.047)
Class 7 0.005 — 0.005 0.006 — 0.006
(0.049) — (0.049) (0.059) — (0.059)
1999-2002 2002-05
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.045 0.025 0.020 0.091 0.031 0.060
(0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.032) (0.017) (0.026)
Prais
Class 1 0.000 0.000 — 0.130 0.130 —
(0.005) (0.005) — (0.083) (0.083) —
Class 2 0.087 0.043 0.044 0.199 0.052 0.148
(0.057) (0.040) (0.043) (0.088) (0.049) (0.077)
Class 3 0.103 0.103 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.134
(0.070) (0.070) (0.001) (0.084) (0.006) (0.084)
Class 4 0.061 0.000 0.061 0.063 0.000 0.063
(0.056) (0.001) (0.056) (0.058) (0.003) (0.058)
Class 5 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.004
(0.057) (0.032) (0.047) (0.055) (0.037) (0.041)
Class 6 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.005
(0.047) (0.011) (0.046) (0.048) (0.015) (0.045)
Class 7 0.005 — 0.005 0.006 — 0.006
(0.047) — (0.047) (0.056) — (0.056)
24Table 6: Posterior Moments of Initial Ratings Distribution: Latin American Countries
Year Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7
1996 0.0093 0.3166 0.4202 0.2221 0.0099 0.0106 0.0112
(0.0295) (0.1392) (0.1507) (0.1323) (0.0297) (0.0308) (0.0346)
1999 0.0947 0.3757 0.3260 0.1882 0.0055 0.0051 0.0048
(0.0589) (0.0989) (0.0943) (0.0794) (0.0176) (0.0147) (0.0150)
2002 0.1420 0.3261 0.2869 0.2290 0.0056 0.0061 0.0043
(0.0736) (0.0996) (0.0940) (0.0843) (0.0185) (0.0202) (0.0135)
largely comparable. However, we can see that while the upward mobility scores for these
two periods are almost identical, the downward mobility score for 2002-2005 (0.060) is
36% higher than the corresponding score for 1996-2002 (0.044). Once again, our results
demonstrate the need to be able to decompose overall ratings migration scores into their
upward and downward components.
Next, we concentrate on an interesting group of countries that also went through a
large amount of economic upheaval during the sample period, namely, the Transition
economies of the former socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and the
former Soviet Republics. The mobility scores for these countries are reported in Table 7.
The overall mobility score for the Transition countries for the entire 1996-2005 period
(0.146) is comparable to that of the Asian countries for the same time period (0.180).
However, while the upward mobility score of the former countries (0.146) is about 40%
higher than the downward score. By contrast, the upward and downward mobility scores
of the Asian countries are roughly similar (0.096 and 0.084 respectively). The contrast
between the countries is even more stark when we have to take a closer look at ratings
migration within the three sub-periods. In the ﬁrst sub-period (1996-1999), while the
downward mobility scores for both Asian and Transition countries are much higher than
the respective upward mobility scores, the downward mobility score of the Asian countries
(0.229) is nearly four times that of the Transition countries (0.062). Similarly, in the
second sub-period (1999-2002), the upward mobility score of the Transition countries
25Table 7: Mobility Measures: Transition Countries
1996-2005 1996-99
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.146 0.104 0.041 0.063 0.001 0.062
(0.031) (0.027) (0.016) (0.028) (0.009) (0.026)
Prais
Class 1 0.137 0.137 — 0.006 0.006 —
(0.116) (0.116) — (0.055) (0.055) —
Class 2 0.186 0.124 0.062 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.067) (0.056) (0.040) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004)
Class 3 0.317 0.159 0.157 0.303 0.001 0.303
(0.091) (0.074) (0.072) (0.126) (0.006) (0.126)
Class 4 0.197 0.173 0.024 0.057 0.000 0.056
(0.062) (0.059) (0.023) (0.052) (0.002) (0.052)
Class 5 0.032 0.032 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.030) (0.030) (0.002) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
Class 6 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.040) (0.001) (0.040)
Class 7 0.005 — 0.005 0.008 — 0.008
(0.042) — (0.042) (0.066) — (0.066)
1999-2002 2002-05
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.229 0.207 0.023 0.081 0.080 0.001
(0.054) (0.051) (0.018) (0.037) (0.034) (0.010)
Prais
Class 1 0.244 0.244 — 0.001 0.001 —
(0.190) (0.190) — (0.009) (0.009) —
Class 2 0.247 0.123 0.125 0.224 0.224 0.000
(0.103) (0.077) (0.080) (0.134) (0.134) (0.000)
Class 3 0.374 0.374 0.000 0.156 0.156 0.000
(0.161) (0.161) (0.002) (0.130) (0.130) (0.007)
Class 4 0.374 0.374 0.000 0.098 0.098 0.000
(0.115) (0.115) (0.003) (0.093) (0.093) (0.001)
Class 5 0.124 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.106) (0.106) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Class 6 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.046) (0.023) (0.040) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Class 7 0.007 — 0.007 0.006 — 0.006
(0.064) — (0.064) (0.057) — (0.057)
26(0.207) is not just (nearly) ten times the downward mobility score,7 it is also nearly
double the upward mobility score of the Asian countries (0.117). Finally, in the third
sub-period (2002-2005), while almost the entire mobility score for the Transition countries
(0.081) can be accounted for by upward mobility (0.080),8 the downward mobility score
for the Asian countries (0.034) is about 50% of the upward mobility score.
The need to look at upward and downward mobility separately, however, becomes
most apparent when we compare the mobility scores for the Latin American and the
Transition countries. In the ﬁrst sub-period, the overall mobility scores for Latin Amer-
ican countries (0.077) and the Transition countries (0.063) are similar and the diﬀerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, while the upward and downward mobility scores
for the former countries for this period are roughly the same (0.032 and 0.044 respec-
tively), downward mobility in Transition countries is mostly accounted for by downward
mobility (0.062). Similarly, in the third sub-period, the overall mobility scores for these
two groups of countries are not much diﬀerent, 0.091 for Latin American countries and
0.081 for Transition countries. However, while downward mobility accounts for about
two-thirds of this mobility in Latin America, upward mobility accounts for nearly all of
the mobility among the Transition countries.
Finally we investigate the ratings mobility of the OECD countries. These mobility
scores are reported in Table 8. We can see that the overall mobility score of 0.127 of
these industrialized countries for the full sample period (1996-2005) is similar to those of
the Transition economies (0.146) and somewhat lower than that of the Asian countries
(0.180). As with the Transition countries, upward mobility accounts for most of this
overall mobility score for the OECD countries.9 However, while the downward mobility
7With the sole exception of the countries in ratings class 2, sovereign debt ratings almost always
improved for Transition economies during this period. The most amount of action for this period occurred
for those countries that were initially in either ratings class 3 or 4. They had identical probabilities of
moving to a higher ratings class of 0.374.
8However, unlike in the second sub-period, where the majority of the movement was from bonds that
were rated in ratings classes 3, 4, and 5, the majority of the movement in third sub-period (2002-2005)
was in ratings class 2.
9Overall, it appears that the OECD sovereign debt ratings were not aﬀected by the economic crises
27still accounts for 28% of the overall mobility score of the Transition economies, it accounts
for less than 1% of the overall mobility in the Transition countries. We can make a similar
observation about the contrasts between the OECD and Asian countries during the ﬁrst
sub-period. In 1996-1999, the overall mobility score of the Asian countries (0.246) is
nearly the same as that of the OECD countries (0.229). However, while downward
mobility accounts for 93% of the overall mobility score for the former, it accounts for
less than 1% of the mobility score for the latter. Our results once again highlight the
analytical shortcomings of a single overall ratings mobility score, and the importance of
having separate estimates for upward and downward mobility.
In this section, we have successfully demonstrated the need for separate upward and
downward mobility scores and, correspondingly, the shortcoming of an overall mobility
score in painting an accurate picture about ratings migration patterns, especially when
the sample of countries (or bond issuers) is heterogeneous in nature. One ﬁnal question
that remains is whether the upward and downward mobility scores estimated using our
algorithm are sensible as well. As discussed earlier in this paper, our estimates suggest
the following, among others: (a) A large number of Asian countries experienced ratings
downgrade in the wake of the 1997 crisis, but their ratings bounced back shortly there-
after. (b) The ratings of the Latin American countries, which were largely non-investment
grade to begin with, were not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the Asian crisis. However, these
countries did not beneﬁt from the subsequent upward mobility in Asian (and also Tran-
sition) countries. (c) The Transition economies, which were anticipating accession to
the European Union, and the macroeconomic stability associated with the membership,
experienced continued ratings upgrade during much of the period. (d) Countries in the
in Asia and Latin America (except of course for those countries that are also included in the Asian
and Latin American groups). Further, it appears that the sovereign debt ratings of the weaker OECD
countries have generally improved over time to the extent that there is now very little ratings mobility
in the sovereign debt ratings for these rich developed countries. Given that most of them were in ratings
classes 5, 6 and 7 by 2002, the conditional likelihood of upward mobility was low, and these countries
were evidently able to deal with factors like rising commodity prices without much of an adverse impact
on their credit worthiness.
28Table 8: Mobility Measures: OECD Countries
1996-2005 1996-99
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.127 0.126 0.001 0.229 0.222 0.006
(0.044) (0.044) (0.002) (0.049) (0.048) (0.007)
Prais
Class 1 0.006 0.006 — 0.005 0.005 —
(0.073) (0.073) — (0.066) (0.066) —
Class 2 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.000
(0.054) (0.053) (0.007) (0.060) (0.058) (0.012)
Class 3 0.233 0.232 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.181) (0.180) (0.004) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006)
Class 4 0.119 0.119 0.000 0.302 0.302 0.001
(0.103) (0.103) (0.001) (0.221) (0.221) (0.010)
Class 5 0.238 0.238 0.000 0.905 0.905 0.000
(0.136) (0.136) (0.001) (0.168) (0.168) (0.002)
Class 6 0.155 0.154 0.000 0.117 0.116 0.000
(0.042) (0.042) (0.000) (0.054) (0.054) (0.001)
Class 7 0.008 — 0.008 0.037 — 0.037
(0.008) — (0.008) (0.037) — (0.037)
1999-2002 2002-05
Mobility Measure Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.184 0.184 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.046) (0.046) (0.006) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005)
Prais
Class 1 0.006 0.006 — 0.003 0.003 —
(0.074) (0.074) — (0.052) (0.052) —
Class 2 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.001
(0.064) (0.055) (0.032) (0.071) (0.064) (0.032)
Class 3 0.838 0.838 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000
(0.246) (0.247) (0.008) (0.044) (0.043) (0.006)
Class 4 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.016) (0.016) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001)
Class 5 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Class 6 0.255 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.083) (0.083) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Class 7 0.000 — 0.000 0.000 — 0.000
(0.000) — (0.000) (0.000) — (0.000)
29ratings classes 2, 3 and 4 were disproportionately more likely to experience downward
ratings mobility than their counterparts in the investment grade categories. These results
are consistent with the experiences of the actual countries in our samples.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated a discrete-state ﬁrst order Markov chain model of
(sovereign) debt ratings. We use data on a large cross-section of countries over a ten
year period to estimate ratings migration matrices for the whole sample of countries and
for diﬀerent sub-periods and sub-samples of the countries. As in the existing literature
we ﬁnd that the assumption that the debt ratings migration matrix is constant across
time is too strong of an assumption; the Markov chain is not time-homogenous. We
also ﬁnd that the model is not homogenous in the cross-sectional dimension; there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the ratings migration matrices for diﬀerent sub-groups of
the countries in our sample.
While some of the conclusions of the non-homogeneity of the basic Markov model can
be made from standard mobility scores alone we show that it is important to be able to
decompose the observed mobility into it’s directional components. We use an existing
decomposition of a well-known overall mobility score and show that this decomposition
allows us to better understand the underlying dynamics of the debt ratings migration for
the countries in our sample. In particular, we show that in some cases while the overall
mobility scores between periods are almost identical the directional mobility scores are
starkly diﬀerent, both in a statistical sense and in an economic sense. We also show
that even when we observe diﬀerent overall mobility between either two time periods
of two sub-groups of our sample the directional mobility scores help us better explain
what exactly is diﬀerent between the two samples or periods. This allows us to better
characterize the qualitative properties of the diﬀerent sub-groups of sovereign debt and
30allow us to quantify and sign the change in the quality of the sovereign debt over time
and between sub-groups of the sample.
Our methodology also allows us to similarly decompose conditional overall mobility
scores, i.e., the mobility scores for diﬀerent ratings classes. Indeed, even if the sample size
is small such that some ratings classes have zero observations at a given point in time,
we can overcome the computational problems by using priors for those ratings classes
that are arbitrarily close to (but not equal to) zero. At the same time, our methodology
ensures that the posterior moments for the ratings classes are generated almost entirely
on the basis of the data, with very little weights attached to the non-zero priors. However,
while we report the conditional mobility scores for the full sample as well as the sub-
samples, for all time periods, in the interest of brevity, we do not full discuss those results,
which reinforce our main ﬁndings.
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